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Summary
Economists and political observers agree state governments defaulting on their debt obligations is a
growing concern. How best to aid struggling states, however, is a point of contention. This Issue Brief
makes a case against ex post restructuring measures, specifically bankruptcy modeled on Chapter 9 of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and in favor of ex ante debt mitigation action. In particular, it introduces taxcredit borrowing (TCB) as a potential commitment device for states that would allow for the creation of
super-priority, risk-free debt. TCB ensures that states internalize the risk of default and avoids the moral
hazard problem of states assuming that the federal government will, in a fiscal crisis, use taxpayer money
to offer a bailout. It also incentivizes better monitoring of the borrowing decisions made by state officials,
as the fiscal ramifications of excessive debt would move from state creditors to taxpayers and voters.
Small changes to federal tax policy and likely a subsidy (relative to traditional debt) would be necessary to
encourage tax-credit borrowing, but this new approach can solve the sticky problem of debt prioritization
that continues to mystify states and municipalities.
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Since the beginning of the Great Recession and for the first time since the 1890’s,
many academic and political commentators have begun to voice serious concerns
about the possibility of state governments defaulting on their debt obligations.
Several of the most fiscally troubled states in the country, specifically California, Illinois, and New Jersey,
have struggled with and continue to face eroded tax
bases and higher levels of spending on countercyclical
welfare programs. With less revenue at their disposal,
many states now massively underfund their pension
obligations and borrow at excessive rates,1 all of which
has led credit rating agencies to downgrade these
states’ general-obligation ratings on a regular basis (see
Figure 1).
A frequent refrain from commentators is the
proposal to aid states by allowing them to restructure
or even eliminate some of their debt through a formal,
federal bankruptcy process modeled on Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code. The rationale, quite simply, is
that bankruptcy is preferable to a bailout, as a federal
bailout would explicitly institutionalize the moral hazard of over-borrowing at the state level, which state
administrators may already assume exists implicitly.
In essence, if states are “too big to fail,” as many argue,
then the federal government will have to intervene
and redirect revenues from non-failing states to
prevent a state’s default. With the threat of contagion

SUMMARY
• With good reason, economists and political observers have
begun to voice serious concerns about the possibility of state
governments defaulting on their debt obligations. How best to
aid struggling states, however, is a point of contention.
• This Issue Brief makes a case against ex post restructuring
measures, specifically bankruptcy modeled on Chapter 9 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and in favor of ex ante debt mitigation
action. In particular, it introduces tax-credit borrowing (TCB)
as a potential commitment device for states that would allow
for the creation of super-priority, risk-free debt.
• TCB ensures that states internalize the risk of default and
avoids the moral hazard problem of states assuming that
the federal government will, in a fiscal crisis, use taxpayer
money to offer a bailout. It also incentivizes better monitoring of the borrowing decisions made by state officials, as the
fiscal ramifications of excessive debt would move from state
creditors to taxpayers and voters.
• Small changes to federal tax policy and likely a subsidy (relative to traditional debt) would be necessary to encourage
tax-credit borrowing, but this new approach can solve the
sticky problem of debt prioritization that continues to mystify
states and municipalities.
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and spillover effects to other states,
bailouts are unavoidable absent an
alternative path forward. Therefore,
so the thinking goes, bankruptcy at
the state level must be made available. But academics and politicians
alike have had mixed reactions to this
proposal, and for good reasons. One
in particular is that it ignores the less
than obvious reality that states would
never willingly concede to undergo
formal bankruptcy proceedings, even
if they were forced to default on their
debt obligations.
States already have the power
to alter their debts unilaterally by
extending the maturities of their
bonds or by reducing the principal
or interest rates they choose to repay.
The constitutionality of these actions
actually does not matter because
states are protected by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. Lenders have
no legal recourse in the event of a
default on state debt or even in the
case of (arguably illegal) unilateral
debt re-composition. Additionally,
states can take advantage of de facto
Chapter 9 protections right now, but
none choose to do so.2 In a bankruptcy, states would have to relinquish
their power to externalize risk (i.e.,
redirect risk to other states), but being
contagious is valuable for states—as

FIGURE 1 RATIO OF LONG-TERM DEBT OBLIGATIONS TO STATE INCOME
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Note: The four largest states (by population) among the lowest ranking states in the Mercatus Center’s 2016 “Ranking of States by Fiscal
Condition” report all have extremely high ratios of long-term obligations to state income. These four states alone represent 21% of the total
U.S. population.

The problem necessarily requires predefault mitigation. This Issue Brief
presents such an approach in the form
of “tax-credit borrowing.”3

noted above, it underlies the notion
that they are too big to fail. Regardless, no entity, not even the federal
government, can require a state to
avail itself of that recourse, especially
given its potential uselessness, which
stems from Chapter 9’s insolvency
requirement. The bankruptcy approach
could very likely be too little, too
late. Ultimately, any solution to curb
excessive state borrowing must be ex
ante, as states would never consent to
ex post federal restructuring measures.

Tax-credit borrowing (TCB) is a
financing mechanism (similar to but
in place of traditional forms of state
debt) that can act as a commitment
device for a state, ensuring that it

financing arm, funded through appropriations. As such, this
new municipality could declare bankruptcy, even though the
state itself is ineligible for bankruptcy relief under Chapter 9.

a divergent opinion, see David Gamage and Darien Shanske
(2011), “Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and
Political Salience,” 65 Tax L. Rev. 19.

TAX OFFSETS IN LIEU OF
CASH OUTLAYS

NOTES
1

A useful definition of excessive debt is debt that results in
socially wasteful spending—projects that the polity, however defined, values at less than cost.

2

A state could leverage the Bankruptcy Code’s generous
definition of “municipality,” and create a municipality whose
sole purpose would be to issue all debt for the entire
state. It would issue general-obligation bonds, back state
employees’ pension rights, and reimburse trade creditors.
This entity would not be the state itself, but rather its sole

3

This Issue Brief is based principally on: Vincent S.J. Buccola (2014), “An Ex Ante Approach to Excessive State Debt,”
Duke Law Journal, Vol. 64: 235.

4

This is mathematically true, but the relevant players in the
markets and at the polls may not see this the same way. For

2

5

A 2012 study by Anna Gelpern published under the title
“Bankruptcy Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign
Debt” in the Yale Law Journal reveals that 40 of the 50
states bar money-damages suits in their own courts, and
no state consents to damages actions in federal court. Of
the 10 states that do allow money-damages actions, the
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uncollected dollar receivable within
the same reporting window.4 Therefore, the difference in this approach is
not financial but legal, as TCB would
require a state, rather than the creditors, to invoke judicial process. If a
state were to pursue collective action,
the U.S. Constitution’s Contract
Clause would defend the tax-underpayment actions of creditors. As a
result, TCB would enable the creation
of super-priority, risk-free debt. Here
is why.

meets all of its debt obligations as
originally composed. Through the
issuance of tax-credit bonds, TCB
circumvents the protections offered to
a state by sovereign immunity, and it
internalizes financial risk, which likely
would lead to a reduction in borrowing overall.
The concept can be explained in
this way. If a state were to no longer
repay its creditors with cash outlays
from its revenue (according to terms
it could unilaterally alter), but instead
creditors were compensated for the
capital they lent to a state by lowering their tax burdens through tax
credits linked to these new tax-credit
bonds, any attempt by a state to collect
that revenue would force the state to
assume the role of plaintiff in court.
This circumvents the sovereign immunity doctrine, which treats states as
unassailable defendants but does not
substantively privilege them as plaintiffs. TCB would give the creditors
who invest in tax-credit bonds the legal
recourse to be made whole, especially
in times of extreme fiscal hardship for
states, without actually requiring the
intervention of courts. Creditors would
merely offset their taxes by the amount
a state owed them.
Logistically, an extra dollar
payable by a state is the same as an

FISCAL POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
Despite the recent experiences of the
Detroit bankruptcy and the sovereign
debt defaults in Puerto Rico, practitioners in the sphere of public finance
still cannot solve the problem of how
a state or territory can credibly issue
debt that is arranged by priority of
payment obligation. Distinguishing
debt on a seniority or secured basis
is ubiquitous in the private sector,
but sovereign immunity at the state
level (i.e., no judicial remedy) negates
all attempts at structuring state debt
portfolios with such distinctions. In
turn, if another default were to occur,
it is not clear when (if ever) and
which (if any) lenders, vendors, or

NOTES
legislatures in each state remain free to strip their courts of
jurisdiction in anticipation of a default.
6

See notes 3 and 25 in Buccola (2014).

7

Because tax-credit bonds can lower a state tax bill, an
individual would end up paying higher federal income taxes,
since municipal income and state taxes are eligible federal
income tax deductions. For TCB to be viable, the Tax Code
would need to allow for adjustments to federal taxes for the

theoretical taxes a tax-credit bondholder would not have
paid had they simply owned traditional state debt. This can
be accomplished through a new IRS regulation and does not
require Congressional approval.
8

Meanwhile, outstanding publicly traded debt issued by
states is approximately only $1 trillion. Source: Robert NovyMarx and Joshua Rauh (2011), “Public Pension Promises:
How Big Are They and What Are They Worth?”, 66 J. Fin.,
pp. 1211-1213.

3

employees would be compensated. The
lack of prioritization makes debt more
expensive because lenders demand a
premium for accepting higher levels
of financial risk, which stems from the
political risk of default and a subsequent rejection of judicial remedy.5
But without the obstacle of sovereign
immunity, and with minimal changes
to federal tax policy, tax-credit borrowing becomes a risk-free alternative
to traditional debt.
With TCB, states assume the
financial risk of all their borrowing
decisions. This not only protects lenders and reduces borrowing costs, but it
is also a better cure than bankruptcy
for the aforementioned moral hazard
problem (real or perceived), and it
could mitigate the political agency
problem many commentators believe
to be a cause of excessive state debt.
Beginning with the moral hazard
problem, it is plausible that the excessive over-borrowing by states is the
result of state administrators assuming
that their respective states are too big
to fail. If this theory is true, as state
bankruptcy proponents contend, states
are effectively externalizing some of
the risk of default—at least on the
margins and to a degree that affects
state policy—and placing a burden on
the federal government (i.e., taxpayers
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from other states). In this case, TCB
by its nature would ensure that states
internalize this risk, as discretion
over whether or not to take advantage of tax credits linked to tax-credit
bonds is completely up to creditors.
The possibility of default disappears
entirely, although the potential for
fiscal distress remains. But it is simply
the case that there is no empirical
consensus that risk-externalization is
the sole or even the primary cause of
excessive borrowing.6 A more general
question, therefore, may be of greater
interest: what might TCB look like
in a world where states are inclined
to over-borrow? This is not explicitly
a question about risk. There are many
competing theories about state borrowing practices, and many stem from
the standard agency problem.
The agency problem in this
instance posits that politicians overborrow because they are not effectively
monitored. Voters tend to reward
near-term spending and tax-relief
initiatives at the expense of future solvency. Those who will be most affected
by a state’s long-term financial prospects often do a poor job of reigning
in borrowing. In short, over-borrowing is a problem of political dysfunction. TCB would work by shifting the
monitoring incentive to voters because
it first shifts the responsibility for the
financial risk associated with state
debt from the state’s creditors to its
taxpayers and residents. This should
lead to lower levels of borrowing.
But it begs the question of whether
such a shift is normatively preferable.
The answer: it depends. It depends
on, among other things, the expected
effects from the shift on state financial
decisions, including states’ borrowing,
taxing, and spending policies.

If the concern truly is one of
misaligned political incentives, TCB
could help to correct the current
monitoring deficiencies. As it is, the
current monitors of political agents—
the creditors—only care about riskadjusted returns, so the point at which
they will simply stop lending is not
likely related to optimal fiscal policy.

OBJECTIONS TO TAX-CREDIT
BORROWING
1. FEDERAL TAX POLICY
It can reasonably be asked why, if
states will not accept ex post bankruptcy for the reasons outlined above,
they would begin issuing tax-credit
bonds ex ante. There are two possible
motivations: political altruism and/or
a federal subsidy. Regarding altruism, many state administrators likely
would prefer to make responsible
borrowing decisions to protect against
future fiscal troubles, so TCB appears
a rational course of action. But when
a crisis hits, officials begin to make
rash, compromised decisions, as this is
when lobbying efforts from a variety
of competing interest groups are the
most concentrated. But for those who
don’t subscribe to this rosy view, the
adoption of TCB would require a
carrot. At a minimum, the Tax Code
would need to be amended to undo
what is, in effect, a relative subsidy
of traditional bond borrowing (i.e.,
the income tax exemption for interest on state and municipal bonds).
Proponents of TCB would need a
corresponding provision that excludes
from taxation the interest “income”
provided by a tax-credit bond in the
form of a reduced tax liability.7 With
such a provision, TCB is much more
4

attractive than bankruptcy, given its
ability to reduce borrowing costs.
Whether there is any uptake
of TCB absent the threat of financial distress probably depends on
two things. The first is consolidated
interest groups wielding their collective political influence to spur the
adoption of tax-credit bonds in the
marketplace. The example of state
pensioners is explored below.
The second is recognition that
parity with traditional debt is likely
not enough for TCB to gain traction.
State administrators may require an
incentive, such as a relative subsidy of
TCB, for forgoing their natural interest in risk-externalization. Quantifying the size of a TCB subsidy would
require experimentation, but investors would be able to self-sort in the
marketplace and would home in on
an acceptable subsidy amount in short
order. But even if states adopt the use
of tax-credit bonds, there is another
concern once these instruments are in
the marketplace.
2. SECONDARY MARKET LIQUIDITY
It is also appropriate to ask whether
the scope of TCB could ever be wide
enough to have a meaningful impact
on a state’s political economy. Do
investors have a sufficient appetite for
tax-credit bonds? A robust secondary market is critical to support large
issuances of tax-credit bonds. For
traditional municipal and state bonds,
the secondary market is highly liquid
and efficient. But tax-credit bonds
have intrinsic value only to the extent
that market participants expect to owe
taxes to the issuing state. This liquidity concern is more pronounced for
smaller, less populous states.
One response to this concern
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is simply convertibility. If tax-credit
bonds were issued as traditional debt
but with an additional option to convert, then the liquidity problem would
be solved. A convertible tax-credit
bond would trade at a discount relative
to a traditional bond, particularly when
issued by a smaller state or in times of
distress, but the difference would be
negligible for solvent and “trustworthy”
states. A different but complementary
response would be to allow smaller
states to form an interstate compact to
develop a national secondary market—
a reciprocity agreement that would be
enforceable in federal court.

TCB AND PENSIONS: A
PRACTICAL APPLICATION

shortfalls alone account for between
roughly one and three trillion dollars
of debt (see Figure 2).8 TCB could
work to close that gap. As a form of
risk-free, prioritized debt, tax-credit
bonds would be cheaper to issue, and
assuming the concerns raised in the
previous section are addressed, pensioners themselves would benefit from
knowing that their retirement savings
are better protected against default. As

attributes is that it allows creditors to
sort themselves through trade. Lenders who believe themselves relatively
powerless politically or who have
lower risk tolerance levels (e.g., pension funds) would be inclined to buy
tax-credit bonds. On the other hand,
lenders with great political influence or
who have higher risk tolerance levels
(e.g., large municipal investors) would
prefer traditional debt. TCB need not

FIGURE 2 MARKET VALUE OF UNFUNDED PENSION LIABILITY ($ BILLIONS)
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Tax-credit borrowing has a history,
albeit limited, in the United States. In
1997, Congress authorized state and
local governments to issue “qualified
zone academy bonds,” or QZABs.
These QZABs granted lenders tax
offsets in exchange for the use of
their capital, which was designated to
support specific infrastructure development projects. Passing over the
irrelevant details, the takeaway is that
tax-credit bonds were issued to fund
preferred state and local activities.
There is reason to believe that TCB
can work again and on a grander scale
as a means of creating risk-free debt.
And one way to introduce tax-credit
bonds into the marketplace could be
by earmarking the borrowed capital for
the support of a vulnerable group.
One obvious example of a
worthwhile interest to protect, in
the state context, is pension holders.
Assumptions vary widely, but pension
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Note: These four states alone account for 31% of all unfunded pension liability in the country. From the Mercatus Center’s 2016 “Ranking of
States by Fiscal Condition” report.

a concentrated lobby and voting bloc,
they could wield significant influence
over politicians and encourage the
adoption of TCB as a mechanism for
raising future capital to rebuild state
pension trust funds.
Even if TCB only comprises
a small piece of a state’s total debt
portfolio, it could still serve a useful purpose. One of its appealing

5

be wholesale, and the protection of
specific, vulnerable people or classes
may be a good entry point for this new
approach to the problem of excessive
state debt.

CONCLUSION
In the last few years, the perilous
financial conditions of many Ameri-
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can states have come into clearer
focus. Recent cases of fiscal distress in
places like Detroit and Puerto Rico
have led many academics and politicians to consider options for debt
relief should an imminent threat of
default emerge at the state level. This
Issue Brief makes a case against ex
post restructuring measures, specifically bankruptcy modeled on Chapter
9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and
in favor of ex ante debt mitigation

action. In particular, it introduces
tax-credit borrowing as a potential
commitment device for states that
would allow for the creation of superpriority, risk-free debt. Tax-credit
borrowing precludes the opportunity
of default by reversing the plaintiff/
defendant distinction that protects
states under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. With super-priority,
risk free debt, there would be better
monitoring of the borrowing decisions

6

made by state officials, as the fiscal
ramifications of excessive debt moves
from state creditors to taxpayers and
voters. Small changes to federal tax
policy and likely a subsidy (relative
to traditional debt) would be necessary to encourage tax-credit borrowing, but this new approach can solve
the sticky problem of debt prioritization that continues to mystify states
and municipalities.
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